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MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OP
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I.—PSYCHOLOGY—A SCIENCE OR A METHOD?
No student of Locke and Hume can read the psychological
works of the present day without feeling anxiety for the fature
of the study of Mind or Experience. The modern psychologist
is profoundly dissatisfied with his subject; the exact and the
classificatory sciences, by the brilliance of their methods and
results, fill him with envy; he is painfully conscious that
mental phenomena are not definite enough to be the objects
of a science ; he must therefore connect them with other
phenomena which are. Hence the " Physiological Psychology"
of our day. But surely this is not psychology, or tho study of
experience, but physiology. Let us keep clearly before our
minds that psychology is the stndy of experience, and inquire
whether it has the marks of a Science or of a Method—whether
it is a speculative, or a practical study.
The objects of a Science properly so called may be of two
kinds: they may be either such as admit of exact measurement,
as the objects of the different branches of physics—heat, light,
electricity, &c.; or such as admit of being classified on a
natural or genealogical principle. Now, do the objects of
mental science fall under either of these heads ? They cannot
be measured or expressed mathematically. There are no
formulae for the various experiences of which we are conscious.
The formulae for nervous action belong to physiology, not to
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446 Psychology—a Science or a Method ?
the study of experience. At first sight it may appear that the
objects of mental science may be classified; but the classifi-
ration of one's own experiences is not one which bears any real
Resemblance to a classification of organs or organisms revealing
genealogical connections, and thus opening up a history of
development. In making this latter statement, we do not
forget the just claims of Comparative Psychology to recog-
nition as a department of study; but we think that its value
is at present overrated. Its scientific claims are based on the
fact that its classifications reveal genealogies. We may admit
this fact, without assigning a very high scientific place to the
study. The genealogies made out by comparative psychology
strike us as extremely unsatisfactory. At best, we have a few
beliefs and'sentiments traced back to earlier forms—often by
the aid of a good deal of mere guessing; but nothing in the
way of results really entitling the study to be called a science.
It is not a science in the same sense in which comparative
philology, for instance, is a science. Here the results are not
only numerous, but as definite as those in any other classifi-
catory science; and moreover the comparative philologist has
certain principles—e.g., Grimm's law—derived from his com-
parative studies, which enable him to proceed deductively. It
may be said that the comparative psychologist has the laws of
mental association which enable him to treat the genealogy of
mental states deductively. But our knowledge of the laws of
mental association was not derived from the comparative study
of mind, but from the introspection of our own consciousness.
They were formulated long before the days of comparative
psychology. This, of course, would not affect the scientific
claims of comparative psychology if we could be sure that the
laws of mental association as employed by the comparative
psychologist are true expressions of the actual ways in which
psychical development has taken place, as we are sure that
Grimm's law is the formula for phonetic changes which have
actually taken place. The laws of mental association, as given
in our manuals of psychology, are, doubtless, correct expres-
sions of the ways in which ideas are actually called up—the
evidence which we have for them being our own personal
consciousness of them. But they are, after all, expressions of
the widest generality; they are not the media axunnata upon
which a deductive psychology can rest. Its media axiomata,
or really fruitful premisses, must give more particular infor-
mation respecting the kinds of ideas which are contiguous or
similar, and the hinds of connections which are novel or
inseparable in different individuals or races. Real premisses
of this sort can be abstracted only from the special study of
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these individuals or races. It is a matter of the greatest
difficulty for the psychologist not to apply directly the general
laws of association which his own consciousness supplies him
with—his own contiguities, similarities, surprises—to the
minds of low races; if, in his desire to avoid this error, he
does not fall into its opposite and ascribe to them modes of
association as unlike his own as he can make them. What
guarantee then have we that the so-called deductive method of
comparative psychology is not more akin to Scholasticism than
to Naturforschung ? How shall we distinguish between
Culturgeschichte and simple introspection? That this is not
an idle question, any one may satisfy himself who reads Adolf
Bastian's Dor Mensch in der Geschichtc, a work in which
comparative investigations are dominated by simple intro-
spection of the worst kind—that against which Bacon and
Locke protested when they called upon men to return to the
data of their senses and the thoughtful examination of their
own faculties. This fundamental introspection Bastian, who
merely exaggerates the tendency of a large school, neglects
for the introspection of notioncs tcmero a rebus abstracts.
Hence his works have two aspects. They are at once syste-
matic and confused. A brilliantly red line of theory connects
fact with fact, and yet any sensible reader perceives that these
facts are most of them irrelevant, because the well-informed
author has evidently not realised them for himself in his own
mind. The chief danger, it appears to us, of the present
crisis in the study of psychology is that the novel facts and
attractive generalisations of Oulturgeschichte are insensibly
casting discredit upon the thoughtful introspection of one's
own adult experience, without which real knowledge and
correct conduct are impossible. At the same time, psycho-
logists, more and more impressed by the impossibility of
giving an exact scientific account of subjective states and their
mutual relations, are turning their attention from these stateH
to their physiological accompaniments, in the hope of thus
constructing a scientific psychology. Because there can be no
science of subjective experience, they show a tendency to
ignore it, and to stamp introspection, as compared with
physiology, as a waste of time. Mill condemns simple
introspection, but, at the same time, maintains the existence
of a science of psychology distinct from physiology.
Students of Locke, Berkeley and Hume do not require to be
reminded that it is by Introspection, and not by Comparison,
that these thinkers conduct all their principal inquiries. Their
method is to turn the reader's attention from meaningless
words to his own actual thoughts—to ask him what he is
30*
 at Cam
bridge U
niversity on A
ugust 18, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
448 Psychology—a Science or a Method ?
conscious of in his own mind when he uses such words as
Substance and Cause. Such appeals to the reader's own
consciousness are essential to the old method of English
psychology. Locke, Berkeley and Hume cannot with any
justice be claimed as adherents of the comparative method,
although, doubtless, they occasionally use it. The question
then presents itself—Was their psychology, a science at all ?
It certainly has not the marks required of the science of
psychology by the modern English school. We venture to
say that this school in setting up a science of Psychology has
ty-oken tho Euglish tradition. The English tradition was to
stndy mind not in order to construct a science of mind, but in
order to find a method which should bear fruit in objective
inquiries. The great merit of the Locke-school is that it
swept away the merely phantastical and verbal sciences of
mind which Animism and Scholasticism had bequeathed. But
it did not construct another science of mind of its own to take
their place. It saw clearly that to do so would be to create a
new animism and scholasticism. The one object which Locke,
Berkeley and Hume kept constantly before them was to put
men in full possession of their own minds as organs for the
discovery of truth and the critical estimation of scientific and
other ideas. The passage in Locke's " Epistle to the Header "
is well known where he says—" Were it fit to trouble thee
with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee that five
or six friends meeting at my chamber and discoursing on a
subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a
stand by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we
had a while puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer to
the resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came
into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that
before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was
necessary to examine our own abilities and see what objects
our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with.
This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented;
and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first
inquiry."
Locke, Berkeley and Hume were critics. They found
science and ethics cultivated securely in a spirit of debased
conventionalism. They supplied the torpedo-shock by asking
questions like these—" Do you understand what you are
talking about when you use this word and that 1"—" Do men
really hold this and that belief which you ascribe to them V—
" Can they desire or do this or that which you say it is their
duty to desire or do V By buch appeals to their individual
consciousness men were roused from their " dogmatic
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slumber/' and put in possession of their natural faculties.
It will be readily admitted, we think, that logical method, as
we now understand and use it, would be impossible, did the
interpretation of experience continue to postulate the concep-
tions of material substratum and necessary connection. So
long as men held that Truth is the correspondence between
perceptions and substrata, their science could be only verbal,
if it did not degenerate into Pyrrhonism. It was Locke and
Berkeley who pointed out that Truth is the correspondence
between the order of ideas and the order of perceptions, and
Hume who made it impossible for men to rehabilitate this
hitter order as a qnasi-substratum. Without this foregoing
criticism, our Inductive Logic, or the Method of estimating
the constancy of sequences, would have been impossible.
Locke, Berkeley and Hume supplied what we may call critical
prolegomena to the Logic of our day. They showed once for
all that we must use our senses; that we must acquiesce in the
order of sensible phenomena; that correct reasoning is the
exact mental reproduction of this order; and that we must
not try to explain particular connections, or render them
plausible to ourselves by postulating general propositions or
a metaphysical bond. Nearly all that is of fundamental
importance in modern logic is thus contained in Locke and
his two followers. Locke, besides his indication of the true
source of knowledge, supplied a theory of Reasoning, which is
identical with Mill s; Berkeley farther developed this theory
by means of his fertile suggestion that scientific discovery is
a hermeneutio of Signs; and Hume, probably profiting by
Berkeley's refutation of the assumption of the optic writers,
said nearly all that is said by modern logicians in their chapters
on Causation. The moderns deserve all credit for the manner
in which they have followed out the lines thus laid down by
their groat predecessors in logical method; but it is all the
more surprising that they display so little appreciation of the
spirit in which these lines were drawn. The great conceptions
with which the old school enriched them were obtained, as we
have pointed out, by a habit of thoughtful introspection; any
fair mind setting itself to the work of self-examination could
not fail to see that all its scientific knowledge comes from
without, that it infers one particular from another, and that it
is never conscious of anything like a necessary bond connecting
phenomena. To hold other beliefs than these, though natural,
implies want of thought. Modern writers have accepted, in
Logic, the results of this thoughtful attitude—but, we venture
to think, only dogmatically; the real attitude of their own
minds is different. They maintain, as psychologists, that
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introspection is essentially fallacious. They therefore have an
end in view which Locke and Hume did not contemplate, when
they examined Human Understanding according to the intro-
spective method. We do not, of coarse, maintain that the
comparison of the data of introspection with the inferred
experiences of other people, and, where possible, of the lower
animals, does not give valuable results of a certain kind; but
we protest against the growing tendency to allow this sort of
Culturgeschichte to cast discredit upon the thoughtful exami-
nation by the adult of his own adult experience. It may be
said that Oulturgeschichte interprets adult experience, and aids
thoughtful self-examination. It certainly ought to do BO, and
to a certain extent actually doeB; but to a much greater extent,
we fear, it dissipates the mind amid a mass of often irrelevant
narrations, and, after all, gives no laws which are properly
scientific, because they have not been obtained by the employ-
ment of the recognised methods of science, which are admitted
to be inapplicable to sociological phenomena. The laws
extracted from OuUurgeschichte constitute, perhaps, a Philo-
sophy of History or Civilisation—an extremely wide subject—
too wide to be called Psychology, we think, and too vague to
rank as a science. The growth of religious, moral and
scientific ideas is certainly an important and interesting study.
But it is not a science because it is interesting, nor is it prac-
tically so important as the thoughtful inspection of our own
common experience which can be carried out very well without
its aid. That it is not practically important in Logic is proved
by the fact that, as we have seen, logic owes its fundamental
conceptions to introspection as practised by Locke, Berkeley
and Hume. In Ethics it may be thought that the results of
Oulturgeschichte are of more importance. But we do not think
that they are. They are, at any rate, virtually ignored by a
thinker like Mr. Sidgwick who, in his epoch-making book,
returns to the old English attitude of thoughtful attention to
one's own adult experiences. Against this practical impor-
tance of introspection what scientific claims has comparative
psychology to urge ? It furnishes miscellaneous narrations,
but not scientifically definite laws. And if it be urged that a
man may come back from OuUurgeschichte to the study of his
own mind, and find himself able to give a strictly scientific
account of his thoughts, feelings and volitions, we answer
that the psychologists of the present day do not think so, but
feel obliged to connect mental states with their physiological
correlates. Now, as the physiology of the nervous system
is obviously not the study of Mind, what becomes of the
science of Psychology ? Maratov rb t7Soc- Cnltmrgeschichto
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is not a science; and introspection even in the light of
OuUurgeschichte is not a science ; and physiology is not
psychology.
Psychology then, if we retain the word, is a critique, a
Method, a certain thoughtful attitude in science, morals and
literature. It is the critical examination of my own adult
opinions, desires' and tastes in relation to present objects.
uidturgeschichte leads me away from this contemplation of
myself. It may be useful as supplying materials for a natural
method of educating and influencing others, by showing the
ways in which beliefs and habits have been formed; it may
convince men of the impossibility of civilising all races after
one pattern; and in other ways it may bear practical fruit;
but it has rendered the thoughtful attitude of Locke and
Hume unpopular, and this is a serious evil. No amount of
information respecting the evolution of belief or sentiment,
and no amount of mental physiology can ever take the place
of acquaintance with my own real opinions and desires,
Modern works on mental science, with very few exceptions,
forget this. The conditions of ideation, the origin of moral
and aesthetic feelings, and such like, are fully discussed; but
we look in vain for a home-question like this—" After all, do
I really desire nothing for myself but Happiness." Indivi-
dualism—thonghtful reference to one's own experience—is
indeed a rare quality now; hence our books are not likely to
live as classics. Mr. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics is an
exception. Its attitude is eminently personal and reflective,
and, for this reason, we venture to think that it will live, and
take classical rank beside Locke and Hume.
In conclusion, that we may not be misunderstood, let us
repeat that we look upon Ovitv/rgeschichte and Physiological
Psychology as studies of great interest and importance, worthy
in' every sense of the devotion and ability now given to them;
but Burely they would be dearly bought at the price of making
us less accustomed to reflect upon our own personal experience,
which is all in all to us. There ought naturally to be no more
antagonism between OuUurgeschichte or Physiological Psycho-
logy and the thoughtful attitude than there is between geology
or astronomy and the thoughtful attitude; but, as a matter of
fact, there is more. To prevent this matter of fact being
construed to the disadvantage of the thoughtful attitude is Hie
object attempted in the present paper. Let us prosecute our
comparative studies and our physiology by all means; but let
us not allow them to discredit the habit of reflecting upon our
own thoughts, desires and tastes; for upon the cultivation of
this habit our knowledge, conduct and happiness ultimately
depend. J. A. STEWART.
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